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A theory of the Value/Utility of information and knowledge (K) is not really there. This would require a theory of the 
centrality of Goals in minds, and of the role of K relative to Goals and their dynamics. K value is a notion relative to 
Goal value. Inf/K is precisely a resource, a means and the value of means depends on the value of their possible func-
tions and uses. The claim of this paper is that Ks have a Value and Utility, they can be more or less ‘precious’; they have 
a cost and imply some risks; they can be not only useful but negative and dangerous. We also examine the ‘quality’ 
of this resource: its reliability; and its crucial role in goal processing: activating goals, abandoning, choosing, plan-
ning, formulating intentions, decide to act. ‘Relevance theory’, Information theory, Epistemic Utility theory, etc. are not 
enough for providing a theory of the Value/Utility of K. And also truthfulness is not ‘the’ Value of K. Even true informa-
tion can be noxious for the subject.
© 2016 The Author(s). This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, 
and indicate if changes were made.
Knowledge itself is power (Francis Bacon)
Premise
Knowledge has/is a ‘value’. Does this obvious claim have 
a theory, which explains it and how/why? I’m not so sure. 
We will argue that such a theory:
  • is not the ‘Relevance theory’ from Pragmatics;
  • it is not the Information theory;
  • or the Epistemic Utility theory;
  • it is not the truthfulness that gives value to a knowl-
edge item
In our frame knowledge and its processing is not the 
essence of mind; thus our claim is that the value/aim of 
knowledge (any doxastic representation)1 is not (just) a 
stronger Cognition, a knowledge increment.
The value of knowledge has to be derived from (the 
value of) its Goals, that is, from its use and utility; and 
also from its necessity and reliability. A doxastic informa-
tion, representation it is just a resource; it is ‘power’.
What is mind for?
Doxastic/epistemic information (Knowledge) is not the 
center, the end, the sense, and the real nature of ‘Mind’. 
The center of gravity of mind are Goals, which—on the 
basis of knowledge—have to successfully drive our behav-
ior. Mind is a system for teleological ‘controlling’ conduct 
on the basis of ‘representations’ and their manipulation 
(assumptions on the current state of the world, on the 
1 Let’s simplify this broad category and set of mental representations 
(including ‘beliefs’, candidate beliefs and data, assumptions, beliefs grounded 
on reliable evidences and sources, beliefs that the system meta-believe to 
be ‘true’ and uses as such, expectations, hypotheses,…) by using the term 
“knowledge” (as rather traditional in AI and Cognitive Science models) for 
all the doxastic representations that the Agent builds and employs, for rely-
ing on them when acting or deciding. I will also use the more neutral terms 
of ’Information item’ or ’data’. I will discuss later the problem of Information 
items value in relation to ‘true knowledge’ and the value of the truth.
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powers of the Agent, future-augmented reality-imagi-
nation & anticipation-, desired states,…); a system built 
to ‘solve problems’ by working on the representation of 
them (that is, ‘mentally’), by reasoning, planning and 
deciding.
Our thesis
This distortion in the view of Cognition is the reason why 
a theory of the Value/Utility of information in term of 
knowledge is not really there; systematically grounded 
and developed. This would require (as we said) a view of 
the role that K has in relation to Goals and their dynam-
ics, management. K value is a notion relative to Goals 
and their Value. Since Inf/K is a means, the value of 
means depends on the value of their possible goals/uses. 
We search for, acquire, buy, preserve, use, consume,.. 
exchange… this crucial ‘power’2 for realizing goals.
The thesis of this paper (a preliminary exploration, not 
a complete systematization) is that Ks are just a funda-
mental resource; just means for (potential) goals. Ks have 
a Value and Utility, they can be more or less ‘precious’; 
they have a cost and imply some risks; they can not only 
be useful but negative and dangerous,… In a sense, one 
should apply to K—in this goal-oriented perspective—a 
‘economic’ frame.
Of course, it is true that in humans the acquisition and 
storage of K has become an end in itself (and even an 
‘intrinsic motivation’ and a ‘value’) (section “Goal pro-
cessing and the utility of beliefs”). Subjectively we do not 
necessary search for knowledge acquisition instrumen-
tally to a foreseen ‘use’ of it. Nevertheless, the function of 
K is instrumental. In human evolution, psychology, and 
society means becomes ends (this holds not only for K, 
but for social image and relations, for money, for power, 
for conformity to norms, etc.).
“Relevance”, “information” etc. are not enough
We will discuss here—in a rather finalized way just in 
view of our objective and claims—the limits of Relevance 
theory, of Information theory, and of other approaches, 
that in our view do not solve the problem of the ‘utility’ 
and ‘value’ of information items and knowledge.
‘Relevance’ is not so clear and is not enough
It is not our aim here to discuss or develop the theory of 
‘Relevance’; which, on one side, it is strongly bounded to 
pragmatics and communication theory (which are not 
our topics here); on the other side, it is quite rich and 
complex and not so clearly defined and systematized. We 
2 The cited Bacon’s sentence does not refer only to social power, to the fact 
that K gives power over the others since makes them dependent on us; but 
more basically it refer to the fact that to know means to be able and in con-
dition of, to have the ’power of ’ realizing something.
will give here a reductive view of ‘Relevance’ just in order 
to introduce some important ‘distinguo’. We do not need 
just the notion of ‘Relevance’ but those of ‘Utility’ and its 
measure, of ‘pertinence, etc. And we do not just focus 
on communication or mere cognitive processing, but on 
cognition for motivated action.
We have two main criticisms towards the Relevance 
notion and theory.
First, this notion doesn’t have a convergent definition 
and use,3 and even in the different domains and 
approaches it is not very clear and rigorously defined; it is 
based on rather vague notions.
Not just communication and knowledge processing
Second, our claim is that Relevance theory (we will focus 
on the most important version, by Sperber and Wilson 
1986) is just centered on communication and/or cogni-
tion. It lacks one of its fundamental pillars (action and 
goals). It is quite strong in its foundation on (explicit) 
communication theory; but it is weak as for its cognitive 
foundation, which is not reducible to communication 
requisites and effects, and to merely epistemic functions 
and need for Information.
Let’s us—for characterizing in a synthetic way Rele-
vance theory-refer to the very authoritative synthesis by 
Wilson and Sperber (2003).
“Relevance theory may be seen as an attempt to 
work out in detail one of Grice’s central claims: that 
an essential feature of most human communication, 
both verbal and non-verbal, is the expression and 
recognition of intentions. According to inferential 
model of communication, a communicator provides 
evidence of her intention to convey a certain mean-
ing, which is inferred by the audience on the basis of 
the evidence provided… The goal of inferential prag-
matics is to explain how the hearer infers the speak-
er’s meaning on the basis of the evidence provided. 
… The central claim of relevance theory is that the 
expectations of relevance raised by an utterance are 
precise enough, and predictable enough, to guide the 
hearer towards the speaker’s meaning.”
We can see how Relevance and its theory are explicitly 
and very strongly related to (linguistic) communication 
and to Pragmatics, in particular to Grice’s view of it.
3 For example: “System Oriented Theories do not try to define but pre-
suppose, the fundamental concept of relevance understood as a relation 
between some information and an informee”…. “The concept of relevance is 
arguably the fundamental concept of IR [information retrieval]. […] we pur-
posely avoid giving a formal definition of relevance. The reason behind our 
decision is that the notion of relevance has never been defined precisely in 
IR. Although there has been a large number of attempts towards a definition 
of the concept of relevance, there has never been agreement about a unique 
and precise definition”. Crestani et al. (1998) (cited by Floridi 2007).
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When they move to generalization as for “Relevance 
and Cognition” they (correctly but very vaguely) claim 
that:
“Intuitively, relevance is a potential property not 
only of utterances and other observable phenomena, 
but of thoughts, memories and conclusions of infer-
ences. In relevance-theoretic terms, any external 
stimulus or internal representation which provides 
an input to cognitive processes may be relevant to an 
individual at some time…. the search for relevance is 
a basic feature of human cognition, which communi-
cators may exploit”.
They try to “introduce the basic cognitive notion of rel-
evance and the Cognitive Principle of Relevance”:
“When is an input relevant? Intuitively, an input (a 
sight, a sound, an utterance, a memory) is relevant 
to an individual when it connects [?] with back-
ground information he has available to yield con-
clusions that matter [?] to him: say, by answering a 
question he had in mind, improving his knowledge 
on a certain topic, settling a doubt, confirming a 
suspicion, or correcting a mistaken impression. In 
relevance-theoretic terms, an input is relevant to an 
individual when its processing in a context of avail-
able assumptions yields a POSITIVE COGNITIVE 
EFFECT” (even identified with “true conclusions”! 
see below).
This is for us a very biased view of when and why infor-
mation “matters” for a cognitive agent.
Communication—it is true—just exploits a much more 
general and foundational feature of cognition: acquir-
ing ‘relevant’ information. But ‘relevant’, important, for 
what? If is not just for communicating and understanding 
messages. Why given information “matters” for a guy if 
we put aside the understanding of the other’s messages? 
What defines its ‘Utility’?
A more general and foundational theory of Cognition, 
K, and its functions is clearly lacking here; a view not just 
centered on doxastic structures and processes (like infer-
ences) or on “true conclusions”. Their examples are typi-
cally just oriented to epistemic goals and functions. And 
the notion of “positive cognitive effect” (which should 
clarify the issue) is quite general and vague.4
4 In their frame what we find definitely correct is: the context dependent 
view of Relevance; its comparative and not absolute character; the change of 
the salience; the idea of the costs and "efforts" (although just reduced to cog-
nitive "processing effort"); the idea of human cognitive tendency: “Relevance 
theory claims that humans do have an automatic tendency to maximise 
relevance, not because we have a choice in the matter—we rarely do – but 
because of the way our cognitive systems have evolved. Cognitive Principle 
of Relevance: Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of 
relevance”.
“A positive cognitive effect is a worthwhile difference 
to the individual’s representation of the world—a 
true conclusion, for example. False conclusions are 
not worth having. They are cognitive effects, but not 
positive ones5 … An efficient cognitive system is one 
which tends to pick out genuinely relevant inputs, 
yielding genuinely true conclusions.”6
In other words, those strictly “cognitive” processing 
and effects/results/products (inferences, answers, argu-
ments for, detection of contradictions,…) are just a sub-
case, a restricted view of K, Inf inputs ‘uses’, utility, that 
is, of the goals they are useful for, and in particular a 
special kind of goals that are ‘functions’ (section “Goals 
and their value”). K and its processing is “for” something, 
and this makes a given piece of K more or less relevant or 
better ‘useful for’ a given (cognitive) function. But there 
are much larger set of non-epistemic functions and of 
explicit objectives and uses of epistemic inputs.
Given our different objective and our distancing 
from ‘Relevance’ as central notion, let us do not use for 
our main object the term of ‘Relevance’; this for two 
reasons:
  • It is too strongly related to such noble tradition, to 
linguistics pragmatics, and to epistemic processes;
  • We want a more general, basic, pragmatic (action 
related) term: like ‘Utility’, ‘Value’; related to practical 
(activity theory) notions similarly to other concepts 
like: ‘means’, ‘instrumental’, ‘useful’, ‘result’, ‘costs’, 
‘risks’,….
Thus, we will sketch here a general and basic theory of 
Inf or Knowledge Utility and Value, as a crucial ground 
eventually also for Relevance theory (but this is not our 
aim here) and as a crucial ground in general for under-
standing human cognition.
Not just ‘information’
Let’s shortly present the important contribution of 
Luciano Floridi on informativeness and Relevance, as 
grounded on probability and information theory.7
5 We will also contest that only true beliefs are useful/positive, and false 
ones are always noxious.
6 In our view the notion of ‘Relevance’ has also been mixed up and has 
obscured another crucial notion and theory: that of ‘Pertinence’: what is 
‘about’ what I’m interested in (see section “Where is ‘pertinence’ theory?”, 
and Note 14).
7 I will in particular exploit for synthesis a very clear contribution of Floridi 
“Relevant Information or How philosophy can help you find the informa-
tion that you really need.” 2007. For a much more extended and deep theory 
see (Floridi 2011).
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Floridi clearly enounces the problem, as: “When is 
information relevant? How can we analyze the concept of 
information that interests8 the agent?”
He moves from classical Relevance Theory (“query”, 
“answer”…) and proposes: a probabilistic revision of it; 
a counterfactual revision; a meta-informational revision. 
With strong arguments and proposals. He synthesizes 
also disadvantages of Relevance theory; like:
  • no account of relevant misinformation;
  • no distinction between informativeness and perti-
nence9
  • no distinction of degrees of relevance and hence of 
epistemic utility…
And his conclusion is that:
“Agents require a constant flow and a high level of 
processing of relevant information in order to inter-
act successfully [?] among them and with the envi-
ronment in which they are embedded. Standard 
theories of information are silent on the nature of 
relevant semantic information. A subjectivist inter-
pretation can account satisfactorily for several 
important applications and interpretations of the 
concept of relevant information. The interpretation 
provides the missing foundation for a general theory 
of relevance.”
This is true and relevant, however—in our view—it 
would be also required an explicit theory of why informa-
tion is needed “in order to interact successfully” with the 
environment; that is, to act and to achieve goals. In his 
much more advanced model, Floridi however does not 
abandon the strictly “cognitive” view of Inf relevance and 
of its “epistemic utility”. The basic notions of the process 
model still are “question” “answer” etc. (see Fig. 1). It is 
not really explained what does it mean that a given input 
“matters” for the agent. His view of cognition seems put-
ting aside an explicit/systematic theory of the motiva-
tional aspects and of the action regulation.
Not just ‘information’ quantity
In general, in our perspective, “Information theory” can-
not solve the problem of the Utility of the information 
items.
The mathematical theory of information is based on 
probability theory and statistics, and it also provides a 
8 “Interest” is a precious term, but ambiguous: interest just as addi-
tional information, for epistemic finality (“epistemic utility”), for curi-
osity or understanding something; or for practical advantages, for my 
‘interest’ = ‘convenience’? (see section “Other distinctions”).
9 As for this never defined crucial notion see section “Where is ‘pertinence’ 
theory?”.
measure of information, with several quantities of infor-
mation (Shannon, Kolmogorov,..)
So, one might claim (within this frame) that:
•  The more informative (in this sense) a given input, Inf 
item, the greater its Value
For us this is quite reductive and wrong.
It is possible that:
•  A less informative data/input be much more relevant 
and useful for my specific issue and Goal
Epistemic utility theory
Epistemic utility theory (Pettigrew 2010)—despite its 
name—deals with a quite different problem.
“How should rational believers pursue the aim 
of truth? Epistemic utility theorists have argued 
that the framework of decision theory can explain 
what it means for rational belief to have the aim of 
approximating the truth.” They follow Bayesianism 
and other theories of partial beliefs in modeling an 
agent’s epistemic state at a given time t by a belief 
function bt, which takes each proposition A about 
which the agent has an opinion and returns a real 
number bt(A) such that 0 bt(A).
“We take bt(A) to measure the agent’s degree of belief 
in A at time t.”10
“One of the central projects of formal epistemology 
concerns the formulation and justification of epis-
temic norms. Epistemic utility theory has so far fur-
nished us with a number of arguments for some of 
the central norms governing partial beliefs”.
So the aim of this strong approach is the formulation of 
norms for a rational11 believing and truth approximation; 
and notice that the ‘utility’ of an epistemic representation 
is just identified with the “truth” or better with: the aim of 
approximating the truth.
Not just ‘economics’ of information
The ‘Economics’ of information typically focus on rather 
different problems.
Perfect or asymmetric information
The dominating part of economic theory is grounded on 
the assumption of “perfect information” in the economic 
10 See section “The epistemic integration value of K items” and (Paglieri 
and Castelfranchi 2005) for our less formal/strong but more psychological 
approach to this problem.
11 In a quite ‘normative’ and prescriptive sense: how we should correctly 
believe.
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subjects/actors. The most advanced and accepted 
model of the general economic ‘equilibrium’ in a mar-
ket economics is based on such hypothesis that the sub-
jects operating in the market are perfectly and equally 
informed. Only on such a basis, the market economy 
produces the optimal results (in Pareto’s sense) without 
any public intervention, as postulated by liberal ideology. 
These are the condition for a good working of the “invis-
ible hand”.
This paradigm is considered too ‘normative’, idealized, 
from the new “economics of Information” for modeling 
a lot of real economic problems and dynamics, where 
the information accessible from the various subjects is 
imperfect; both partial and frequently wrong (opinions 
not truth). 2001 Nobel price to Stiglitz, G. Akerlof e M. 
Spence was given precisely for this revolutionary theory 
of “asymmetric information”. This asymmetry and differ-
ent distribution of information is crucial for explaining 
for example the dynamics between a major and his agent, 
and their contract; or the problem of financial markets, 
or of credit, which is intrinsically connected with prob-
lems of getting the complete and correct information. 
And so on.
Epistemic utility
A very important approach is that on the “Expected util-
ity value of a given information” Value of information (or 
epistemic utility) has been used in philosophy of science 
to model how much a truth seeker would be willing to 
pay for information (obtained, e.g., by running an experi-
ment) prior to making a decision. Specifically, according 
to the standard view (Fallis 2000; Levi 1962), an agent has 
to make a decision, i.e., he has to choose one action 
among A_1,…, A_n. The value of a certain information 
(e.g., the value of running a given experiment)  is identi-
fied with the difference between the highest value of 
Fig. 1 Relevant Information (from Floridi 2007)
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utility the agent is expected to obtain in the actual situa-
tion and the highest value of utility the agent is expected 
to obtain after having obtained the information (e.g., 
after having run the experiment). In other words, the 
expected utility value of given information specifies how 
much the information would improve the agent’s deci-
sion.12 Moreover, in Fallis’ work a model is presented 
“that assigns different epistemic utilities directly to differ-
ent degrees of belief that a truth seeker might have in a 
true hypothesis”; this is very close to the role we give to 
the degree of certainty grounded on specific sources and 
supports.
This theory is definitely interesting for the explicit 
instrumental relation put between information and util-
ity maximization (the economic unifying and unique 
‘goal’), and also it captures some crucial aspects of our 
frame. However, it is a bit restricted since it cannot give 
us a typology and an explanation of how and why that 
Inf increases our achievement probability and value 
(one should have a model of our different goals, of their 
processing conditions, and of the multiple relationships 
between beliefs and action).13 More in general, it cap-
tures only the role of Inf for the decision making, 
while—as we saw—there are various roles of K in rela-
tion to goals, which give value to K acquisition; for 
example the value of K for possible future goals (section 
“K quality”).
Moreover, this model can just give us a notion of the 
‘subjective’ utility of that information, not of its ‘objective’ 
utility (section “Other distinctions”) for the subject and 
his achievement and profit.
A more recent and growing domain in economics 
(more management and business oriented) is the “info-
nomics”: focused on the central role of information as 
business ‘capital’, ‘asset’ (Moody and Walsh 1999), and 
the best strategies for selecting, acquiring, and exploiting 
precious data in front of the revolution of digitalization 
of the market relations (suppliers, clients, distribution,..), 
and with the explosion of Big Data, etc. (Laney 2012). 
These are important studies (with a correct instrumental 
view of ‘data’), but without any cognitive foundation or 
interest.
12 I have to thank Emiliano Lorini for signaling to me this literature. See also 
Howard (1966), with the notion of the expected value of perfect information 
or of sample information. In the same perspective it is taylored the defini-
tion of "Value of Information" in the Business Dictionary: "Maximum price 
one should pay for knowing the actual value of an uncertainty before decid-
ing on a course of action". http://www.businessdictionary.com.
13 For example, distinguishing when the Inf produces an improvement of 
the probability to achieve the goal or the value of the goal or the degree of 
its achievement.
Where is ‘pertinence’ theory?
As we said the notion of ‘Relevance’ has also mixed up 
and obscured another crucial notion: that of ‘Perti-
nence’,14 which, on the contrary, definitely deserves its 
own theory.
Information, data, and thus beliefs and knowledge are 
‘about’ something; they inform specifically ON something, 
not on everything or arbitrarily. The obvious claim is that:
•  Only ‘pertinent’ information on my issue can be 
useful for me (and be ‘relevant’).
If I get some information (even new and surprising) 
on a completely different and independent problem and 
domain, this doesn’t help me (for my given Goal G’); it 
has no value relative to it (it can be useful for new goals 
and activate new goals of mine).
But on the other side, it is not sufficient for being useful 
and having value that given information be ‘pertinent’ for 
that issue, be ‘about’ my objects and topic.
•  Not all the information ‘about’ my current object 
(Obj) is useful for my goals on that object.
However, there is a basic problem before and for 
exploring this issue: What does it means that given 
information is ‘pertinent’ for a given Obj and ‘about’ 
that Obj?
Let us—in a cognitive frame—define this notion in a 
quite simple but direct way.
Mind works with and on ‘mental representations’ (rep-
resentations OF something!). Any representation has a 
‘content’, an ‘object’. The objects of a ‘propositional rep-
resentation’ are its Predicate and Arguments (it informs 
about them and their relation); the objects of a sensory-
motor representation (an image, a perception) are its 
perceptual parts/components and their relations. The 
representation is “about” its objects (see Appendix 1).
Given a Goal G’ and its Objs, our claim is that another 
representation (doxastic or motivational) is ‘pertinent’ 
for G’ (but not necessarily useful) IFF its objects partially 
overlap with G’ objects.
However, these are the ‘directly’ pertinent informing 
data; but there are also ‘indirectly’ pertinent ones; which 
just ‘indirectly’ are ‘about’ the Obj.
•  If from a given data or goal (R’) about Obj’’ I can 
infer, derive another data/goal (R”) on Obj’ (the Obj 
14 In French texts actually Sperber and Wilson use the term “pertinance” 
for “relevance”. This is the French meaning of this word, but not the English 
or the Italian one (more related to the Latin original meaning). “Pertinent” 
means that “pertains”, while “relevant” means “important”, “considerable“.
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of my starting goal or belief ) R’ becomes ‘indirectly’ 
pertinent, indirectly ‘about’ my Obj’.
Thus,
•  Only a representation (doxastic or motivational) 
directly or indirectly about the contents of my Goal 
can be useful (and relevant) for me.
But, as we said, a lot of information that is ‘about’ can 
be absolutely irrelevant, useless, and mere noise.
Network‑based Pertinence
Reasonably, there is also another crucial factor for deter-
mining and predicting if a given K/D/belief is informing, 
is pertinent about X. It is the structure of the network of 
(episodic or generic) Ks ‘about’. Our representations—
in particular the doxastic ones (data, beliefs,..)—are not 
stored as files or lists; they are organized in a specific way. 
Let us simplify by using the more clear and schematic 
‘propositional’ format. The proposition (content of a pos-
sible belief ) P’ is represented in terms of a given predicate 
(Pred) with its argument(s) (arg). For example B1: Pred 
(arg1 arg2); B1: Eat (John, bred). The organization of the 
data/Ks is around its arguments. We put around arg1 
(John) all the beliefs or data we have directly about it, 
that is, mentioning it as an argument; and the same for all 
the data about arg2. If the predicate is not a simple sin-
gle-argument ‘property’ but is a ‘relation (like ‘to eat’) this 
proposition (belief,..) connects the two (or more) nodes, 
and these representations and Ks, builds a Network.
Such network determines relation of direct vs. indirect 
connections, and of proximity; and also degrees of con-
nection. For example, given the network in Fig. 2a, X is 
clearly closer to, more strongly and directly connected 
with Y than with Z. However, not only the ‘steps’ matters, 
but also the number of connections, the topology of the 
net. For example in Fig, 2b X is more connected with Y 
then with Z.
However, in our view this relation is not so trivial: Is 
necessarily informative about X any K about/on Y if Y is 
strongly connected with X? Not necessarily; not all the 
Ks about Y are pertinent for X. John has a dog, this dog 
yesterday has meet another dog in a garden; is that per-
tinent and informative about John? Non necessarily. But 
of course—in our view—even less informative about X is 
a belief about an entity not connected at all with X; a dog 
in another continent and ignored by John.
We remain on our claim: to be pertinent for X, to give 
information about X, a K not directly about X must poten-
tially be the basis, must give the opportunity of inferring 
something on X. The relation with the network structure 
and its dimensions (proximity, number of connections) is 
this one: the strongly related, connected Y to X, the more 
probable that a D/K on Y be informative (has something 
to say, to derive) about X. If Johns’ dog gets fleas this 
probably has consequences for John, and we can infer, 
expect something about him; if a dog met in the garden 
has fleas this is for sure less pertinent and relevant about 
John.
So, the structure of connection between nodes is 
important, but the pertinence and possible informative-
ness about a node depends on possible inferences.
Another network structure is obviously crucial. In fact 
it is not just a matter of topology (proximity, etc.), it is 
also a matter of the semantics of the specific link. A very 
crucial link is the ISA relation: the link between a Class 
and its sub-classes and members (individual instances). 
Around the Class nodes we have the ‘generalized’ K 
(what we know about not a specific dog or car or action 
Fig. 2 Our claim is that the more connected Y with X, the more probable that an Inf (data) about Y be informative also about X, pertinent for having K 
about X
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of eating but about dogs, cars, eating,..); this generalized 
information is there precisely in order to be inferred/
instantiated on the members. So, if we (come to) know 
that X belongs to the Class C’, we automatically (come to) 
know a lot of things ‘about’ X.
Similarly, our K can be organized and assembled in 
‘domains’ (like “sport”, “politics”, “art”,…). If my Obj of 
interest is within a given ‘domain’, probably the Inf within 
the same domain can be ‘indirectly’ pertinent for Obj. Or 
better, the probability that an Inf item in that domain be 
pertinent (and relevant) are greater than the probability 
of an Inf item of an independent/unconnected ‘domain’.
Goals and their value
Since we will derive the V of K from the value of goals, 
we should first to rough out the theory of goals and of 
the bases of their Value. We will just remind this theory 
(which is quite rich and complex) in its very basic fea-
tures, by just reminding the basic properties of goals that 
are necessary for this theory of K Value. However, we 
have, first of all to introduce a crucial distinction within 
two kinds of scientific teleological, finalistic perspectives 
and notions (and thus two possible meanings of “goal”).
A very important distinction—that we cannot exten-
sively explain here—is between
  • ‘Goals’ in psychological sense, as the mental antici-
patory representation of a state of the world, moving 
and guiding—as a control device—the action which 
is “goal-driven or directed”); vs.
  • ‘Goals’ in functional sense (we will use the term of 
‘function’); that is, the result, outcome of a given fea-
ture or behavior which feedbacks on the entity and 
reproduces that feature/behavior, and thus itself. That 
‘result’ is no longer a mere ‘effect’ but it is the ‘rea-
son’ for the existence of that feature/behavior, which 
become “goal-oriented”, finalized, adaptive/useful for.
As for the theory of ‘utility’ of Inf items, of K, we will 
mainly focus here on explicit psychological goals, but not 
only on that: we will also examine a bit some pseudo-
goals and functions, like K integration and support; or 
processing and selecting goal on the basis of epistemic 
inputs; or the ‘functions’ of our goal of curiosity, and of 
acquiring and just storing K.
Goals15
A goal is not a special kind of representation, different 
from a doxastic representation; it is instead a mental rep-
resentation with a specific ‘use’, ‘function’, ‘role’, ‘applica-
tion’. Beliefs (etc.) and goals are just one and the same 
15 For a more systematic theory see Castelfranchi (2012).
kind of representations, simply employed in two different 
ways. In fact, it has to be possible for such representa-
tions to match, in order to characterize the state in which 
an agent believes his/her goal to be satisfied. Beliefs and 
goals are two different possible ‘attitudes’ on the repre-
sentations. For example, the same visual image can be 
used in a given circumstance as a belief about the current 
state of the world, and in another case as representing a 
state of the world to be achieved, i.e. a goal.
A goal is not necessarily pursued; a representation does 
not acquire the status of a goal only if and when it is 
being pursued as an ‘objective’.16 It is a goal (i.e., it plays 
the role of a goal) also in other stages of the control cycle; 
this is in fact the model of modern cognitive notion of 
‘goal’ and of goal-directed behavior. Only in some cases, I 
have to ‘actively’ pursue my goals. When the realization is 
(believed to be) possible and depending on me, being up 
to me, then, either I subjectively “try” (the result is not 
subjectively sure) or I intentionally act for realizing it and 
confidently expect the desired outcome.17
In sum, a goal is a goal even before or without being 
pursued: satisfaction or happiness are due to goal-reali-
zation, and dissatisfaction or suffering are due to goal 
frustration, but not necessarily to our active successes 
or failures; we are sad because our mother has died, or 
happy because she gave us a kiss, even if we did not ask 
for it, nor do or expected anything from her.
There are different kinds of mental goals: end goals vs. 
instrumental goals (means) and their hierarchical struc-
ture; plans; intentions; motivating and non-motivating 
goals; projects; expectations,.. Let’s just focus on a differ-
ence that is relevant for the theory of goal Value: the dif-
ference between ‘felt’ and ‘non-felt’ goals.
Kinds of goals
“Goal” is not a synonym of “desire”. We do not accept to 
use as the basic, starting notion for possible motivated/
goal-driven behaviors, the notion of “desires” (like in 
Bratman’s view, like in BDI logics, like in several philo-
sophical and psychological uses). Desires are not at all the 
unique or general starting point of the motivational pro-
cess. We have different kinds of goals, and some of them 
have nothing desirable in se’, but they just are instrumen-
tal, useful, or even oppressive or disagreeable duties.
Desires are just one kind and one possible origin of 
goals. They are ‘endogenous’ goals. When realized, they 
give pleasure, whereas not all goals provide us with a 
16 Unfortunately in English the word "goal" tends to have such restricted 
connotation.
17 Although in fact any possible action actually (consciously or uncon-
sciously) is an “attempt” and relies on some external process/agent for its 
accomplishment (Lorini et al. 2006).
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hedonistic experience once achieved (e.g., turning off the 
light can be an important goal, but doing so does not give 
us any particular pleasure).
This is important for a theory of decision and choice: in 
fact, choices are not only between ‘desires’ or attractive, 
desirable possible outcomes; we chose between desires, 
needs, practical things, duties,…; between harms or costs 
or threats; between plans, means, projects, programs,… 
not necessarily desirable in se’. Let’s go a bit more deeply 
on felt goals.
‘Desire’ and ‘Needs’ as felt goals
‘Desire’ in strict sense of “desiring” something18; a specific 
mental state/activity and feeling. This desire is necessar-
ily ‘felt’ (implying sensations), while not all the goals are 
“felt”; even not all the motivating goals are necessarily 
affectively charged and pleasant and attractive (at least in 
principle, in a general theory of purposive behavior). 
‘Being desiring’ (“star desiderando”) in strict sense means 
the anticipated imagination of the ‘desirable’, pleasant, 
goal-state. The goal is represented in sensory-motor code 
and thus gives to the subject sensations (the flavor, the 
contact, the emotion,…) of the real object when realized. 
The subject is actually imagining these sensations and 
gets some ‘hallucination’, some anticipatory pleasure 
(foretaste). This can even imply not only the activation of 
‘somatic markers’ (the central neural trace of previous 
somatic experiences), but the actual activation of the 
body, sending sensations: ex. salivation, erection, etc.
We do not “feel” all kinds of goals; we just have, formu-
late, an “intention”, a “project”, a “purpose”, a “plan”, etc. 
Instead, we “feel” desires and needs, and this is not by 
accident; they imply active sensory-motor representa-
tions (either “imagined”, evoked from memory, or current 
proprioceptive signals).
Not all our goals (even terminal ones, motivating us) 
entail real felt ‘pleasure’ when realized.19
Needs
Another felt kind of goals are “needs”. A felt need is due to a 
bodily sensation (current stimulus or evoked sensation).20
  • Needs—differently from ‘desires’—are under the 
effect of negative, painful sensations, activating an 
avoidance-goal. Also for this reason we experience 
18 For the broader theory of ‘desires’ see Castelfranchi (2012).
19 Every goal failure is a ’frustration’ and any attainment is ’satisfaction’, but 
not necessarily with a significant and felt subjective experience of pain, irri-
tation and disappointment in the first case, or of joy or pleasure in the sec-
ond one.
20 For a general theory of “needs” (“having an objective need” vs. “subjective 
needs” vs. “felt needs”) see Castelfranchi (1998).
them as ‘necessities’, constraining us, ‘obliging’ us to 
do or not to do something.
  • We also conceptualize and conceive a “need” as a neces-
sary means, as the only possible solution for our goal: 
not only if I have O (what I need (for G))21 I can realize 
G, but if I do not have O I cannot and will not realize 
G. This gives to the general notion of “need” a sense of 
necessity, no choice, which—in the felt needs—is rein-
forced by the unpleasant sensation pushing us.
Emotions and felt value of goals
Although ‘motivation’ is not necessarily related to ‘emo-
tion’ (see Appendix 2), the relation is important and also 
can affect not only goal activation but also goal Value.
There are goals with a felt (affective) value not only 
because of bodily sensation of pleasure or pain like in 
needs or desires, but because they are connected with 
emotions; either because activated by an emotional reac-
tion or because they evoke an affective experience (like 
in Damasio’s “somatic markers”; Damasio 1994). These 
goals have a value also due to what we feel and to its 
intensity. This holds for example for avoidance goals fre-
quently associated to fear, worries,.. or for goals related to 
important moral or esthetic or ideal “values” of us, or for 
goals within affective relationships, or for forms of hostil-
ity related to envy or to resentment, and so on.
The origin of goal value
Since we have more than one goal and several goals can 
be active in the same time and context, and be in conflict 
(incompatible), this is why we have to ‘choose’, to have 
‘preferences’. But this implies that goals have to have a 
subjective ‘value’, that is, a value perceived or assigned by 
the decision-maker: a quantitative dimension enabling 
the decision maker to give them some ordering, by mak-
ing them preferable or not to other goals.22 Our issue 
here is the following one: Where does the value of a goal 
come from?
There are two different sources and kinds of value, 
which may interact (either in synergy or in conflict) with 
each other.
  • The “calculated” value (a), based on means-end rela-
tions (Pascal’s “reasons of the Reason”);
21 Notice that (differently from “desires”) “needs” intrinsically are “instrumen-
tal” goals. I need something for something; it is necessary for realizing some-
thing. Either for achieving a practical goal (practical need: I need the key for 
opening the door), or for stopping or preventing a sufferance.
22 Of course, this value is not the only factor which determines the decision 
to do or not to do something, or the choice between two competing goals. 
The goals’ degree of “urgency”, the estimated probability of achieving them, 
the involved costs, the perceived risks and possible harms are factors which 
also come into play.
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  • The just “felt” and intuitive value (b) (Pascal’s “rea-
sons of the heart” that the Reason cannot under-
stand, since they are not arguable, reasoned, but just 
felt).
a. One kind of value is “calculated”, based on 
means-end relations, on the examination of pos-
sible advantages (“pros”; achieved higher-goals) 
and disadvantages (“cons”; frustrated goals); the 
value of a given goal is derived from its fore-
casted consequences: from the number and val-
ues of the realized higher-goals, and the number 
and values of the frustrated ones (“costs” in 
broad sense). This value is ‘inherited’ from the 
goal hierarchy, from the ends to their means.23
Clearly, this value is based on our beliefs and in par-
ticular our predictions (although automatic, 
memorized) and it is in fact ‘justifiable’: I have 
my explainable ‘reasons’ for choosing a given 
alternative; I have decided to go by train and 
not by car, because so and so. This is in fact 
the domain of persuasive argumentation (while 
marketing and advertising mainly work on the 
second kind of value: affective unconscious asso-
ciations).
b. The other kind of value is not reasoned upon 
or calculated, but just felt and intuitive, and 
not really justifiable. It is due to the (frequently 
unconscious) activation of affective responses 
conditioned to analogous experiences and to the 
‘intensity’ of such sensation, feeling elicited by 
a given anticipatory representation or memory. 
How intense and unpleasant is the sensation due 
to a felt need, to a negative disturbing stimulus 
from our body (hunger, thirst, sleepiness, tired-
ness,..) such that “I need”, “I feel that I need…”? 
How intense the pleasant sensation of a foretast-
ing, of imagining what I desire and expect? How 
intense the negative emotion (fear, disgust, …) 
elicited by an Avoidance goal (a representation 
of something that I’m pushed to avoid, to pre-
vent)? This gives the degree of value.
23 This is why we need a given value of the top-level active goals, or final 
motivations: at a given moment, given our age, gender, personality, culture, 
personal biography, identity and tastes, we have certain final motives with a 
given value for us, and we can choose between different active goals; and/
or we have certain active drives or felt needs and desires, but also our long 
term objectives with their subjective terminal value.
Pascal’s conflict
Given these two possible “values” of the goals and forms 
of appraisal (not necessarily present at the same time) 
they may converge or conflict (Miceli and Castelfranchi 
1989; see also section “Satisfactory not optimizing”): 
one and the same goal can be both very “attractive” 
and very “useful”; or it may be high in “utility” but not 
attractive at all; or very attractive but extremely costly 
and irrational.
We not only have two independent, parallel, and com-
petitive systems for regulating our behavior, for making 
a given goal prevail: one unconscious, automatic, fast, 
evocation based, affective, etc.; the other based on rea-
soning and deliberation, slow, etc. (like in “dual system” 
theories, nowadays very popular: e.g., Sloman 1996; Sun 
2002; Kahneman 2003). These systems strictly interact 
with each other; more precisely, the affective, evocative 
system enters the space of deliberation, introduces new 
dimensions on goals (value) and beliefs (strength), and 
alters the process and result of our reasoned 
decisions.24
‘Pleasure’ and goal value
This also means that in our model pleasure is not 
“the” goal of our activity, its final motivation; and the 
same holds for feeling pleasure (or avoiding feeling 
pain). “Pleasure”—as a specific and qualitative subjec-
tive experience, sensation (not as an empty tautologi-
cal label for ‘goal satisfaction’)—normally is not a goal 
for us: it is not what we intend to realize/achieve while 
acting, what move us for performing that behavior. Of 
course, feeling pleasure or avoiding pain might become 
real goals and intentionally drive our actions: that is 
basically the mindset of the true hedonist, who acts for 
pleasure and not for whatever practical consequence 
his/her action accomplishes. But typically looking for 
pleasure and avoiding pain are not a unique final goal 
of ours (a monarchic view of mind and motivation): 
rather, they act as ‘signals’ for learning, and they help 
us learning, among other things, how to generate and 
evaluate goals.
In our view, pleasure is more related to the notion of 
‘reward’, of ‘reinforcement’ and learning. Pleasure as an 
internal reward plays two fundamental roles: it attaches 
some value to some achieved state, which is important 
when the system can have more than one of such states, 
possibly in competition with each other; it signals that a 
given outcome (perhaps accidental) ‘deserves’ to be pur-
sued, is good, has to become a goal (that state, not the 
pleasure per sé). In this view, pleasure is a learning device 
24 Slovic’s idea of “affect heuristics” just partially captures this aspect and 
solves the problem of its modeling (Slovic et al. 2002).
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for goal creation/discovery and for evaluation. It seems 
very useful in a system endowed with a ‘generative’ goal 
mechanism, and which needs different kinds of evalua-
tion, more or less intuitive, fast, based on experience or 
on biological/inherited ‘preferences’, and not just on rea-
soning (with its limits, biases, and slowness).
The value of knowledge and its origin
The Value of K strictly depends on its relation with Goals; 
in particular, on three crucial roles K plays:
  • Technical datum; means for pursuing and achiev-
ing G (to know how, to know existent conditions, a 
crucial information like the combination of the safe, 
etc.).
  • Beliefs are the support of our preferences and action: 
if I loose my expectation that that result is ‘possible’ 
(my ‘hope’) I will drop out my goal; the same for my 
belief that G1 is better than G2 (beliefs on the Value 
of the Goal, or better beliefs that give Value to the 
Goal) (see section “Goal processing and the utility of 
beliefs”).
  • Beliefs are frustrating or gratifying; that is, they are 
the failure or realization of our Goal. Achieving a 
goal (in a cybernetic model) just means that the epis-
temic representation and the motivational one do 
match; achieving a goal just means to believe that the 
goal is achieved.25
Deriving the K value
As just said, a piece of information (data or belief ) is ‘rel-
evant’ or better ‘useful’ only relative to some Goal: either 
it represents/is the ‘frustration’ or the ‘satisfaction’ of the 
Goal; or it is a necessary condition for a given action for 
achieving the Goal. Let’s focus on the second case.
a. The Knowledge Value (KV) is due to the value/impor-
tance of the goal G’ (G’V)
This is a bit too simple; the theory of Value presupposes 
the theory of ‘evaluation’. Given that we do not have only 
one goal but open sets of goals; and we may have a set 
of currently ‘active’ goals, and a set of possible or future 
goals, we have to consider the Utility of a given Inf or K 
in relation not just a single (and actually pursued or taken 
into account) goal, but in relation to a given Set of goals 
(Sg) considered by the subject in its evaluation. Thus, the 
value of K is due to the value/importance of the goal-set Sg 
it is useful for, and their value.
The evaluation (attribution of ‘Value’) to a given entity 
Obj in fact is usually multi-dimensional; there is not just 
25 Remember Seneca’s sentence: “We are so unhappy as we believe to be”!.
one parameter, one standard26 or criteria (in other terms 
one current or possible use and goal) relative to whom we 
appraise the correspondence and utility of Obj. This 
implies also that there is a sum of partial values of Obj. It 
can be ‘good’ in relation to goal or Value G1 & G2 & G3, 
and thus be more precious of an Obj just useful/good for 
G2. However, it can also be very good for G1 but frustrat-
ing, harming G2. Thus the Value of Obj is the value of G1 
minus the Value of the frustrated goal: it is partially good 
and partially bad.
Consider for example (section “The costs and risks of 
K” ii) when the subject decides to revise a lot of her pre-
vious knowledge, to made a ‘revolution’ of her view about 
Obj. The new Inf—although very costly from that point 
of view of abandoning previous certainties, of restructur-
ing a K world, of revising a lot—is so convincing, authori-
tative, not rejectable that she decides to accept it. Clearly 
enough here there is a conflict, and then an ambivalent 
evaluation (value) of K’: on the one side, a negative value 
(the cost of revising, destroying other sources and trusts), 
on the other side, a positive value; which presupposes 
another goal (explicit or implicit (pseudo-goal)): not only 
to have integrated and supported beliefs, but also the 
goal of having the best ones, the most credible and sup-
ported ones, from the best sources. This goal (which gives 
the positive value/utility to K’) is clearly prevailing on the 
goal of preserving previous knowledge, of not working 
too much for revision.
b. The degree of “contribution”
Second, K Value is due to the degree of “contribution” of 
that piece of K to the choice, plan, action, or G achieve-
ment. A given K/D can contribute more or less: it can 
increase more or less the probability to achieve that goal.
•  The more precious/crucial is K/D for achieving G, and 
the greater the value of G, the greater the value of K/D 
for the subject.
In other words, Data are not equally precious; and this 
predicts:
26 ’Standard’ is a ’Quality’ (the feature that makes Obj good for, apt to, in 
condition of, with the power of,..) generalized to its class or kind: which 
properties/features has to have this kind of Obj in order to be good (for..)? 
After having identified the Qualities and generalized the Standards the 
Evaluation process of Obj (if Obj is good or not for) changes it nature. We 
no longer need to test Obj, in order to see if it produces the desired effect 
(goal); it is enough to see whether it has the needed qualities; or if it corre-
spond to the standard. We know if something is good or bad without direct 
experience of it; as an inferential generalization and instantiation: since 
what make an Obj good-for G is Q1 and Q2, and since Obj’ has such quali-
ties, then it is goof for. We have qualities and standards also for informa-
tion and K acquisition. We know that a given Inf/K is good also without and 
before ’testing’, using it.
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  • The probability to memorize, to preserve, or to forget 
them;
  • The probability to search for them (the value of the 
epistemic goal of acquiring them).27
Useful or necessary?
However, also the idea of the ‘contribution’ of the K item 
is too vague and incomplete; one should in particular be 
more precise on a fact we mentioned: that D/K—as any 
other ‘tool’—can be useful but not necessary; that is, it 
might have alternatives. The many the alternatives to that 
K’ the lower its KV.
In order to achieve G’, I need D1 OR D2 (not D1 & D2). 
Suppose that either D1 or D2 are sufficient for realizing G1: 
if I have/access D1 I can achieve G1; but also if I get/have 
D2 I realize G1. Neither D1 nor D2 is needful. Which is 
the value of D1 or D2? It is the Value of G1 simply divided? 
(Except they have a different probability to bring to G1).
This also makes the KV context dependent. In fact, K 
replaceability or necessity can be related to a given con-
text C: a given K can be accessible or not in a given C but 
not in another; and make more or less precious its alter-
native. In context, C’ to achieve that G it is necessary to 
have/use K’; but not in C”.28
This KV has interesting contextual dynamics. Consider 
this example:
  • In order to achieve G we need three data, we have to 
know: D2 & D2 & D3. The value/importance of the 
Goal is in some sense divided for the number of nec-
essary data: no one of them is sufficient (just the set), 
all of them are necessary.
  • In order to achieve G we already have/acquired D1 
and D2 and we just search/expect for D3, and if we 
obtaining D3 we realize our goal G. At that point, in 
that situation all the value of the goal is concentrated 
on D3: now, it is necessary and sufficient for G.
(So, there is a strange dynamics of the value: the value, 
importance of “acquiring” versus the value of not forget-
ting, of preserving, memorizing).29
27 The greater the perceived V, the preciousness of a given information, the 
greater the Value of the possible (sub-)goal of acquiring and using it.
28 Psychologically the problem might be more complex; since one might 
perceive the contribution of several - although necessary - data as not 
equivalent for the goal achievement. How much G achievement depends on 
that D more than on the others?
29 The context-dependent nature of KV is of course more general (since also 
Goals and their value are context-dependent). An example of the context-
dependent ‘value’ of a given K is a question during an examination or in a 
TV contest: “When is Garibaldi born?” If you know that, if you answer cor-
rectly, you win 10.000$! But after that moment, that K has no longer this 
‘value’!
Necessity and adjustable goals
An important kind of ‘necessity’ of a given information 
(and in general of a given resource) is when we have goals 
that can be ‘partially’ realized.
There are goals that are “Yes/No” “All/Nothing”: either 
we achieve it or not (for example, to get a PhD qualifica-
tion). However, there are other kinds of goals that can be 
achieved just in part: either because they are ‘gradable’, 
they refer to a quantity30; or because they are composed 
of sub-outcomes, and one can achieve a sub-set of the 
global goal. The problem is if that part is satisfactory for 
realizing (enough) that goal. (For example, our goal was 
to have a nice trip and vacation: this part was excellent, 
this was very good, but this event/experience was bad).
Now, a given resource or tool can be necessary for the 
full and complete achievement of the goal, but not indis-
pensable, essential: even without it the goal is OK. For 
example, I have to prepare a given special food: without 
the meet and the potatoes the food is not there at all; with-
out fire, cooker, and oil I could not cook it; without salt it 
is not a good food; however, it would be better to also put 
some oregano inside, and I do not have it. However, it is 
not essential; the food is OK, and is almost perfect.
The same holds for Inf Items; some Inf Items might be 
useful for a full realization of my goal, but some of them 
are good if there but not indispensable.
Belief strength and contribution
The degree of contribution of a given Inf item (belief ) for 
achieving my goal by deciding and by doing something 
(thus it ‘utility value’) is also due to its degree of credibil-
ity, certainty (section “K quality”). Stronger beliefs con-
tribute to a given choice and decision to do, more than 
the doubtful ones. Suppose that for a given choice I need 
six beliefs, but all of them are not very sure; perhaps I will 
suspend my choice or renounce to my goal. Suppose now 
that only two beliefs are quite doubtful while the others 
are quite sure; it is possible that this is for me enough for 
taking that decision. Thus, the role/effect of the various 
beliefs in this decision was not equivalent; the decision is 
more ‘due’ to the stronger beliefs than to the weakest ones 
(that might have deter me from). So the more certain the 
belief the more impact it has on the choice or decision to 
act (section “Goal processing and the utility of beliefs”).
Other distinctions
Subjective or objective value?
Moreover, there is also another crucial and basic aspect 
of ‘value’ on which one should be more precise: its ‘sub-
jective’ or ‘objective’ character.
30 For example, I want to be rich, and I can become the richest person in 
world, or very rich, or riche, or quite rich,..
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There is a ‘subjective utility’ of a given resource (in this 
case of a given K/D), that is the perceived/evaluated use-
fulness by the agent, which determines how much it is 
desired and searched for (the value of the doxastic goal to 
know it). But, there also is an ‘objective value’31 of K’ for 
G’ of Agent’. Not necessarily our evaluation are correct 
and rational or realistic; not necessarily we really under-
stand what we would need and the utility of things/
actions. For example, our ‘interest’ (what would be better 
for us and our goals, or—vice versa—contrary to our 
good) frequently does not coincide with our desires and 
objectives/decisions. We can do not understand what is 
‘in our interest’, and do not realize that we do not under-
stand it: we believe/feel that we know it.
The principles presented here should both apply to 
the subjective KV estimated by the subject and to the 
objective value in the perspective of an ideal observer. 
However, notice that the Set of goals that is used for eval-
uating G’ by the Subject can be and usually is different 
from the Set of goals taken into account by the external 
observer for his ‘objective’ evaluation of the Value of that 
K for the subject.
Of course, also for K ‘Utility’ (also the subjective one) is 
different from ‘Pleasure’. That a given D/K gives us some 
‘pleasure’ can just be an aspect or kind of utility (since 
feel pleasure can be one of our goals). Also a disagreeable 
D/K can be very useful. For example, if I have to demol-
ish a lot of my previous integrated K about Q, to revise 
and work a lot, this might be very unpleasant (and I could 
even resist to K in order do not do that) but can be very 
useful. Saying nothing of the case when subjectively to 
come to know K is very bad and undesirable (I would 
prefer do not know that), but in reality, objectively, this is 
very useful for me (other goals of mine).
Potential Value
There is a V of a K in a given situation, context, for a given 
and specified Goal (as for achieving G1 the value, utility 
of K’ is tot). However, it is also important to realize that:
  • Human beings have a generative and open set of 
Goals; we generate and activate new Goals;
  • A given resource or tool is not just for one and 
unique plan and goal; resources can be multipurpose 
and multiuse; and the same holds for Ks.
Given that, there is a just ‘potential’ Value of a given K 
item or domain: for possible future goals and uses; not 
for an active and specific goal to choose and pursue.
31 That is, from the perspective of an ideal ‘observer’, assumed as perfectly 
informed and rational.
Now, the larger the perceived/expected amplitude, the 
imagined set of goal families K’ is useful for (its ‘polyva-
lence’), and the more important those goals families the 
higher K’ utility; although quite vague and just poten-
tial. Why money has become the dominant objective in 
human activity? Because it is a means for everything and 
thus becomes an end in itself (like K).
Class‑goals
Not only there are vague sets of events but even concep-
tually defined classes. As we saw, doxastic representa-
tions, for example, propositional beliefs, can be specific 
and episodic (about a given event and object) or ‘generic’, 
that is, about a Class. The same applies to Goals; we my 
have an event goal or a class/generic goal: the goal that 
here and now Black be happy is different from the Goal 
to make it happy always when possible.
If a given resource or K is useful for a class-Goal it is 
useful for any possible instantiation of it; thus it is more 
precious than a K useful only for one shot.
Presupposed value
We even acquire knowledge that we do not need now and 
that we believe that is completely useless for us, stupid, 
boring, etc. “Who care! Why I have to learn that!”
However, first, there is in fact some current goal deter-
mining the importance/value of having/using such a K 
(the approval of professor; the vote on the report card; 
etc.). Second, I can trust/believe that it will be probably 
useful for future goals of mine; I trust them (parents, pro-
fessors) that it is useful for me, has value, to learn that. 
Third, this is exactly a case of ‘tutorial’ role in K manage-
ment as a social ‘institution’. We construct the ‘institution’ 
of K that people has to have in this community, for our 
identity and tradition, or for playing possible future roles. 
You do not understand that and do not have these goals 
now, since you follow your current desires not your future 
‘interest’. But K as a collective institution also obliges and 
prescribes some learning (school) independently on your 
current use/utility, and current interests. In sum, this is 
the ‘normative’ way we build the K capital of our society; 
what “count as” instruction and knowledge.32
K quality
Our doxastic representations have a ‘quality’: a subjective 
‘certainty’. We are more or less “sure”, “convinced” that P.
32 Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple 
forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each soci-
ety has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types 
of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms 
and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the 
means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded 
value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with 
saying what counts as true’ (Foucault, in Rabinow 1991).
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In our model the degree of certainty, the strength of a 
belief, depends on its origin, on the sources; on the basis 
of two main principles:
  • The more reliable, trustworthy (competent, honest) 
the source the more sure its information and my 
believing in it.33
  • The many the convergent sources the more sure I feel 
(Castelfranchi 1997).
The degree of certainty should affect the KV: for exam-
ple, I should ‘pay’ a given K from a very trustworthy 
source (or a K with a given degree of certainty) more than 
from a not so reliable source or a doubtful K. The degree 
of certainty (quality of K) has a important value since 
we actually bet and risk on that; we decide to spend our 
resources and actions on the ground of what we believe; 
so our trust in what we believe exposes ourselves to fail-
ure, harms, …
K is a resource that changes its value on the basis of its 
origin, of the brand, of ‘seller or producer’; or because 
the source is/gives a value in itself (like in dogmatic 
knowledge) or because the quality of its products has 
been proved superior (previous experience, reputation, 
marketing,..).
In sum, the Value of K is affected by its degree of cer-
tainty: the more sure, grounded, the more precious it is.
The value of uncertain and doubtful information is 
clearly inferior.
The epistemic integration value of K items
There is also another utility and value of Inf items (data, 
candidate ‘beliefs’), not directly relative to specific 
‘motives’, neither as frustrating/satisfying, nor as tool 
for realizing the goal. There is an ‘importance’ or ‘value’ 
of a given data or beliefs just in relation to knowledge 
organization, integration, mutual consistency and sup-
port. In a sense this importance or value is due to the 
‘pseudo-goal’ of having robust, integrated, knowledge. 
To have coherent and justified knowledge is a crucial 
‘function’ of our cognitive system (for example Thagard 
2000).
Any process of knowledge acquisition, generation or 
elaboration does not only generate some output knowl-
edge item; it also generates a trace of its origin, and 
‘relation’ that supports and integrates such a new item. 
33 This is a bit more complex since in certain cases the ‘source’ (like in com-
munication) can also inform about its own degree of certainty: I trust very 
much that source but she says “I guess that P, but I’m not fully sure”; while 
another source that I do not trust so much might say “I’m absolutely sure 
that Q”. How to combine and weigh up the certainty evaluation from the 
source with the reliability of it?
It generates at the same time knowledge structure (net-
work) or ‘relational knowledge’: Reasons to believe.
This is true not only for inferences, but in general. 
Knowledge items remain related to their source: “I saw 
that p”; “I think that p, because…” “The TV said that p”, 
etc. Thus, there is a special relation between the Belief 
that p, and the Belief “I saw that p” or “the TV said that p” 
or “Since Q then P”.
Consequences of this ‘trace’ and relation theory are the 
following ones:
  • Items are integrated in cognitive nets: you cannot 
eliminate or insert a new item of K, without dealing 
with its supports and relations. This is the well-stud-
ied problem of Belief revision and updating: changes 
are never merely local.
  • Part of the difference between various ‘mental atti-
tudes’ (like: belief, knowledge, opinion, prediction, 
etc.) is to be recalled to the “story” and the support of 
the proposition: its ‘Reasons’.
  • We maintain in our mind both: Reasons to believe, 
and Reasons to Do
We talk about ‘support’ relations, because cognitive 
items hold thanks to such relations.
Now, this cognitive ‘need’ of reason to believe, of sup-
port and integration of K, this structure gives to K items 
different ‘role’ and ‘importance’ or ‘value’. Not all items 
are equally important in a given domain, context, or epi-
sode (independently on their degree of certainty and on 
goals). There are K items more ‘central’, ‘important’, ‘cru-
cial’ while other items are just ‘marginal’, just ‘details’. This 
depends on their network role: is this piece of K sup-
porting and explaining many other Ks of that episode or 
domain? What earthquake would happen if this K would 
result wrong? How much belief-revision work we should 
do? Or this information is quite irrelevant, it doesn’t sup-
port or explain nothing, and we can cheaply abandon 
(drop, revise, forget) it?
In other words, K items have different value and util-
ity in relation to the need for coherence, support, and 
argumentation within our beliefs. It is more probable 
(ad reasonable) that we forget or put aside marginal 
details (that is, facts that are not important for under-
standing the whole, that do not explain the other facts 
and the global event) then central facts. It is more prob-
able that we resist more to revise and abandon crucial, 
central, important items than irrelevant, marginal one.
In sum, K has a peculiar form of Utility and Value—its 
importance—just relative to doxastic (not motivational) 
aspects: how much it is integrated in the K nets and how 
many K items does it support or is supported by, and how 
central is in the topology of the Net?
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Goal processing and the utility of beliefs34
Mind is based on a belief-goal bridge: the real backbone 
of cognition.
  • Beliefs support goals (beliefs as reasons for goals)
  • Beliefs determine goal value
  • Beliefs determine goal processing and dynamics
  • Beliefs determine goal species
But this also gives Value to beliefs, make them more or 
less important from another point of view (different from 
the previous ones).
Beliefs support goals, by acting as reasons for them. A 
cognitive agent is an agent who grounds his actions on 
his beliefs: or better, he acts on the basis of what he wants 
and prefers (goals), but he wants and prefers on the basis 
of what he believes. In a cognitive agent, goals should be 
supported and justified by reasons (not necessarily unbi-
ased and “rational”). We activate, maintain, decide about, 
prefer, plan for, and pursue, goals that are grounded on 
pertinent beliefs (supported by other beliefs, etc.). Goal-
processing is belief-based.
Let’s summarize the role of different types of beliefs in 
filtering the goals and in regulating their transition step 
by step, from their activation to the action execution (for 
extended discussion, see Castelfranchi and Paglieri 2007).
Goal processing has in fact different phases, like: goal 
activation; choice between various active and competing 
goals; goal planning and formulation of an Intention to 
do something; execution of the planned action. Now, all 
these phases require specific information input and 
exploit specific beliefs. So, a given belief can be the con-
dition for the activation of a given desire (for example, I 
see that there is an open ice-cream shop in front of me); 
or a belief is the condition for abandoning a given goal 
(the believe that it is impossible or the belief that between 
two active goals there is a contradiction, a conflict, and 
we have to choose between them); or a condition for 
choosing G’ and not G2 (for example, I believe that this 
dress that I personally like less that the other will be more 
appreciated by John and I want to like to John); or a con-
dition for formulating the intention and the planned 
action (for example, to believe that such action has those 
results and that I’m able to perform it); or a condition for 
the action execution (for example, the information that it 
is the right time). Failing these belief tests would stop the 
processing of a goal (e.g., putting it in a sort of mental 
34 Again: we use ‘belief ’ as prototype of doxastic representation of many 
kinds; this applies also to ‘true’ knowledge items, to mere ‘assumptions’ (I’m 
not sure that P, but decide to proceed “as if ” P was true), to hypothesis, to 
predictions, opinions, etc.
waiting room, until the agent beliefs will allow reactivat-
ing them), or may even eliminate certain goals; on the 
contrary, success of these tests will make a certain goal 
persist until the choice, the planning, the execution of the 
pertinent actions.35
Now, given that a given belief B’ is responsible for the 
acceptance of that G as ‘to be possibly pursued’ (up to 
me), or of the choice of that G as better than its competi-
tors, or as a possible ‘intention’ of mine (I’m able and in 
condition) etc. it acquires a special ‘supporting’ Value. If 
B’ is revised, I have to drop that G; and this may be a cost, 
a waste; or I don’t want to renounce to G for its impor-
tance and attractiveness. This crucial role of B’ may entail 
unconscious ‘refusal’ to revise it36 and even self-decep-
tion in order do not renounce to my G or do not frus-
trated it.
To know just for to know
We have (for evolutionary and cultural reasons) the final 
Goal of acquiring knowledge, the intrinsic motivation of 
curiosity. Thus knowledge and its acquisition can be/have 
a Value per sé.
However, first, curiosity is not for everything, omni-
directional (at least, it is focused on certain domains: our 
‘interests’, in order to restrict an infinite search). But this 
means that we are ‘interested’ in that, that is, we have the 
goal to acquire K in that domain, on that topic.
Second; it is true: we have the final goal to ‘cumulate’ 
and ‘store’ knowledge also without a clear immediate use 
of; like for money, or like ants for food. K it is a ‘good’ per 
sé. However, not all the founded Inf has the same value. 
Like for money it is different to put away 1000§ or 10§. 
How do we evaluate the value of a storable K item, which 
is not immediately to be used for a given active goal G’?
The generic goal to acquire knowledge is insufficient for 
explaining that. We plausibly evaluate in an approximate 
and intuitive way the presumable Value of that new infor-
mation either on the basis of our ‘interest’ in the domain/
topic it is Pertinent for (an area we know that we will 
have goals of specific uses), or in term of potential pos-
sible uses/goals (section “Other distinctions”). Like when 
I decide to buy a dress that I do not need just now for a 
specific ceremony (or I do not want it will be used only for 
that) and I evaluate the probability of other future occa-
sions and good uses of it: “this dress is better; I’m sure that 
I can use it for a lot of other occasions and roles”.
35 For a similar – but less analytical view, with a rather limited theory and 
ontology of goals – see also the well-known “theory of Reasoned Action” by 
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) and also Kruglanski (1996).
36 On the cognitive processes and utility of defense mechanisms like ‘denial’ 
see (Miceli and Castelfranchi 1998); we defend us from K, ideas, mental rep-
resentations!.
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So, even for the INF/K acquired just for the goal of 
acquiring K, there are additional Values/Utilities relative 
to not just to ‘know’, but to possible uses, interests.
Other utility‑related features and value effects
Value losing
Redundancy
Of course an Inf, a piece of K, in order to have value 
for X should first of all not be already possessed by X, 
already known. If it just is a duplicate it has no value for 
X. To have value an Inf must be new or different, that is 
‘informative’.
Nevertheless, the issue is a bit more complex. In fact, 
sometimes it can be useful and desired also to get the 
repetition of a previous (even believed) information. An 
already possessed K can have a utility as ‘confirmation’ 
of the previous one. A non-marginal function; espe-
cially in relation to the strength/quality of K, and of the 
credibility of its source (section “The epistemic integra-
tion value of K items“). To be true and more precise, in 
this case in fact a ‘new’ K is there, and it is this new K 
that makes useful its ‘object’; the is a meta-K that K’ is 
repeated (repeatable) and confirmed. For example, if X 
already believes/knows that P, but search for and get the 
information that “also the source S” supports P, or that 
the original source S’ repeats and insists “that P”, this 
is useful for X (it can reinforce P certainty). However, 
notice that the relevant and new information is about 
the sources of P.
K consumption and expiration date
Strangely enough some K has a “consumption”: once used 
is no longer useful; and thus it looses its value. Other Ks 
can be used several times, and/or for different goals. This 
looks strange since K is a tool, a resource that doesn’t 
wear out with use; or better it just waste a part of its pos-
sible V: its ‘novelty’ and ‘surprise’ (Lorini and Castelf-
ranchi 2007).
However, even without ‘wearing out’ there might be 
different reasons for the ‘consumption’ of a given K item. 
For example, if John already answered to Mary, and 
said that news, I cannot do the same; I cannot ‘inform’ 
Mary about, as a new item. Or if we are in the Prisoner 
Dilemma and what matters is who confesses first, the 
confession of the second one is useless.
Moreover, that K items might have an ‘expiration date’; 
that is, being useful just in that moment and context and 
no longer. For example: (a) the number of the RSA nec-
essary for Internet banking, but changing every minute; 
or a password with a deadline. (b) A precious informa-
tion but for a rapidly evolving phenomenon, like the rise 
at stock exchanges, or weather. Or like a question for an 
examination/test: I give a wrong answer, it is no longer 
useful that later I learn the right one.
Either there is a deadline in the ‘use’ of that item: it is 
true but no longer required; or there is a deadline in the 
K: it is no longer ‘true’.
The costs and risks of K
A piece of K also has costs.
(i) Acquisition costs:37
How much one has to invest (or have invested) in order 
to have K; in terms of time, effort, material resources 
(money,..), relations, sufferance,….
Obviously, the cost should be acceptable relative to KV 
current or possible or for multiple uses.
Nice examples of costs for acquiring K, are: to study; to pay 
an investigator; an intelligence service; reasoning and calcu-
lating; to memorize and store and to try to retrieve, etc.
It is also very relevant the relationship between the 
costs of K acquisition and the risks.
Satisfactory not optimizing
Because of these acquisition costs it not always the best 
to acquire additional knowledge for deciding. Simon’s 
theory of bounded and limited rationality is not only a 
matter on impossibility of computation (we cannot—for 
computational limits—acquire all the pertinent and even 
relevant Inf ); it is also a matter of economics, of costs 
versus value. We cannot wait and defer our decisions by 
continuing to expect or search for additional relevant Inf; 
we have to decide. We have to renounce to an optimal 
or better solution, and accept a “satisfying” one. In fact, 
the cost of additional search, control, reasoning,.. and the 
risks of deferring are at a certain point higher than the 
possible increment of the achieved value (choice). The 
additional K is not convenient, is even negative (loosing 
opportunities): costs and risks are higher than advantages 
(see also section “Not just ‘economics’ of information” 
and Fallis 2000).
Complete information is frequently useless and unus-
able (for time, noise, costs,..). Suppose that Google would 
provide us all the information related to our question, 
however nobody spend times for reading more than the 
first 5-10 retrieved items or the first two pages!
(ii) Acceptance and revision, integration costs
Since our K—at least the explicit one and in the same 
domain—has to be coherent and justified (section “The 
epistemic integration value of K items”), how much 
37 The notion of "costs" is ambiguous; it concernes what we have to spend, 
sacrify, in order to acquire/achieve something, but also bad consequences, 
effects, risks of having or not having something. This ambiguity gives rise 
to this nice paradox of Derek Bok: "If you think education is expensive, try 
ignorance." Not having a relevant K can be very noxious and "expensive", 
however also having K can harm us (section “Useless and harmful Inf”).
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work have I to do in order to include a new informa-
tion? What I have to drop and abandon and how much 
this is difficult? How much the revised beliefs were 
important for my goals or for their role in the integra-
tion and support of the other Ks, or for my trust in its 
source? How demanding is the revision not just of that 
belief but also of the network integrated with it?
Beliefs revision is not a local operation and requires a 
lot of work also because the revision feedbacks also on 
other Ks and on the reliability of the sources. Have I to 
discredit a source? Can I do that? How much revision 
and integration work would this require.
The integration value (section “The epistemic integra-
tion value of K items”) of a given K is proportional to 
the cost of its revision; and the estimated Value of a new 
entry should be definitely superior to the revision costs 
due to its acceptance, and to the integration role/value of 
the dropped items.
(iii) Costs in use
There are not only acquisition cost; a piece of K, a data 
can be more or less expensive in its ‘use’, since it can be 
more or less difficult for retrieval, for derivation, for rea-
soning about. There are ‘difficult’ or ‘simple ‘notions’, and 
memory retrieval, or reasoning or verifications.
(iv) Risks for K and of K
Obviously there are serious risks when we do NOT 
have a given crucial K/Inf (see note 37); but there are also 
serious risks in or for having a given K.
  • There are risks in the path for acquiring a given Inf—
since we have to expose ourselves—, or in having 
such information (for example, a dangerous ‘secret’). 
But also risks in investing and working for having it. 
Or a risk while trusting a given source and Inf and 
‘deciding’ to believe it.
  • There also are risks in using a given K/D; for exam-
ple, to believe that a guy is trustworthy and rely on 
him exposes us to serious risks of failure, of betrayal, 
etc. Or to count on given information exposes us to 
errors, wrong reasoning, wrong decisions, etc. (see 
below about ‘negative K’)
Let’s go a bit deeply in the possible ‘negative’ value of K.
Useless and harmful Inf
Not all Inf is precious or at least useful; some Inf (even 
K in strict sense: “true”; see below) can be useless (for 
a given agent in a given context) and even noxious. It 
would be better do not getting or having it. K/D/Inf dan-
gerousness has different faces and kinds:
•  In a strict sense: to know that P, is harm or can bring 
harm to X:
• Usually this holds when P is false, the Inf is wrong;38
•  Or when the K that P induces sufferance (“It would 
be better do not know it!”); however here it is mat-
ter of priority/importance of the goals: the truth or 
the sufferance?;
•  Or K is even true but misleading for X; or induces 
wrong inferences and beliefs; or induces X to a 
worse choice.
An Inf item (a belief ) can be harmful for example 
because the agent builds—on such a basis—a wrong plan, 
and doesn’t achieve her goal. For example, X plans to go 
with her car to the town center for going to theater; she 
believes that at that time the town center be accessible 
by car (but this is wrong), so she goes with the car but 
cannot access the center, and misses the spectacle since 
arrives too late. If she would have known the truth, she 
would have made another more effective plan.
Analogously, an Inf Item can determine the preference 
and choice between two goals. I have to decide If to take 
or not a medicine and a friend of mine says that that drug 
gives nausea; then I decide do not take the drug. Notice 
that the belief of my friend can be wrong (a wrong asso-
ciation); however, also a true Inf can be in this case nox-
ious by inducing me to avoid an useful drug (for my goal 
of not experiencing nausea it is useful/good; for my goal 
and interest of cure it is noxious/bad). This is why medi-
cal doctors frequently do not explain to patients the so-
called ‘collateral effects’ of drugs; because they know that 
a lot of patients would not take them (See below on dan-
gerous true K).
•  Or to believe P is harmful since it is not convenient:
• The cost was too high for its utility; not worth it
•  It was in fact useless but costly searching for it or 
reasoning about it;
•  It could be cognitively biasing, deviating attention, 
overloading, or confounding.
Thus, there is a Negative Utility of Inf/K, which is not 
just its acquisition, elaboration, conservation cost, but 
also risks and harms it produces.
The agent can be even aware, can believe, that a given 
Inf Item is dangerous.
A K item cannot just being objectively (from an observ-
er’s point of view) harmful for an agent and her goal 
achievement, but also subjectively. That is, the Ag may 
believe that to get that Inf is/would be bad for her, by 
38 However consider that sometimes (self )deception (for example by 
’denial’) is useful for the subject.
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creating more uncertainty or confusion, or by activating 
automatic or affective reactions deviating for her correct 
decision and behavior.
An agent can obviously believe that a certain Inf item 
is necessary for her (and search for it), or believe that 
it would be irrelevant, superfluous, not useful (she has 
already enough Inf, she has already decided or achieve 
her goal); but she can also believe that receiving that Inf 
be noxious. For example, a person that knows to be too 
anxious and that anxiety would paralyze her decisions or 
action, or a person that is phobic of certain conditions, 
has the goal to avoid to receive Inf that might activate 
that reaction.
‘Knowledge’ in strict sense and the dangers of truth
We are sorry for Mill (1823) but there can absolutely be 
‘noxious’ K; not all K is by definition good for humans, 
as he claims. This is even clearer if the parameter is 
not our “good” but our subjective “happiness” (not the 
same!).
Relative to our “happiness” how many times we sin-
cerely say “I would have absolutely preferred do not know 
that! I suffer a lot and cannot do anything at all!”. Or even, 
what I now know obliges me to decisions that waste my 
life and I wouldn’t like to take. I would prefer to live in 
ignorance or deception.
We would like to avoid a deep discussion about what 
is “knowledge” in strict sense (true epistemic representa-
tions). As we said we use K as a broad notion (like used 
in AI, cognitive science) covering different doxastic and 
epistemic representation: Information, data candidate to 
be assumed or not as belief or K, beliefs with different 
degree of certainty, presuppositions, as-if assumptions, 
hypothesis, expectations,….).
Our view of “truth” is radically pragmatic (related to 
the theory of action and goals): that a given assumption, 
presupposition, explicit belief, subjective ‘knowledge’39 is 
efficacy; that is, that an action grounded on such a belief 
(on the world, on me, etc.) and relying on such repre-
sented ‘state on world’ be successful (goal achievement). 
A “true” knowledge is—in this radically pragmatistic 
sense—intrinsically ‘useful’ and of Value, since it is the 
basis of the action and of its success. “To be true” is a 
value and standard, and gives value. Nevertheless, con-
sider that there is not only one goal in our mind and in 
our ‘evaluations’. For example, to “use/rely on” that 
assumption and to “verify” it, are not one and the same 
goal. The belief in the truth of a given K item, implies the 
39 A possible definition is: I believe P and also believe that I believe P on 
a valid base, evidence, and that P correspond to the external, independent, 
’real’ world, and would match if I would controll/test its correspondence by 
an epistemic action.
possible action and potential goal of “verification”, an 
epistemic action aimed at looking at, and seeing if, and 
verifying or falsifying if P. Also relatively to that goal 
(motivating that action: that our assumptions be verified) 
that K is more or less ‘useful’, not only in relation to the 
‘practical’ goal of achieving G’. And the results, success, 
could be different.40
Also for this radically pragmatistic notion of K, it fol-
lows that any K (as such) has value, since we have the goal 
of the truth and that what we believe be true41; but it 
doesn’t follow that such a INF item since it is true (K) can-
not be useless, or even harmful and with a negative value 
relatively to other goals of us. Value is always in relation to 
several goals and dimensions; and that Inf Item (although 
true) can be ambivalent: good as for the goal of truth but 
bad as for other goals or functions.
It seems to me that this view is not contradictory with a 
pragmatic definition of truth; the item could remain true 
even conducing us to some failure on some goal. It is suc-
cessful, valid, for certain actions but not for others or for 
additional goals it elicits or for bad inferences it implies.
Let’s say something not in relation to our (rather pre-
liminary) view of “knowledge” in strict sense, and of 
truthfulness, but in relation to the classical view of truth: 
the assumption correspond to the ‘real’, objective (subject 
independent) state on the world. Like in logical definition 
of the operator “to Know”, where (Know X P) = (Believes 
X P) & P. “X knows P” means that “X believes that P” and 
“P is true” (from the perspective of an ‘observer’ assumed 
as the real state of the world).
In this classical (and common sense) view of truth the 
questions are:
a. Is a True Inf (a “knowledge” in strict sense) necessar-
ily and always good, useful, valuable?
b. Can be a “false” belief/assumption useful, effective, 
for a given goal achievement, not accidentally but 
thanks to its falsity or partiality (ignorance)?
As for (A) the answer is: It depends! “Good” in relation 
to which set of goals, to which evaluative dimensions? As 
we said, for the goal of known the truth, that K Item has 
always value, it contributes to; but relative to other goals 
it is pertinent and relevant for, it can be useless and even 
negative, harmful; although ‘true’.
Let us just focus on some specific negative effects of 
“true” Ks (putting aside the fact that they can produce 
40 This ’evidence’ can also be wrong; the action can be successful although 
the assumption was actually wrong (’objectively’, that is, from the observer’s 
point of view).
41 But not the goal to know everything that is true in the world.
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pain and X can even prefer to die that to live with such a 
painful truth!):
  • True but useless, irrelevant Ks; so I wasted my time 
or money or (mental or practical) efforts, and per-
haps I have lost other opportunities.
  • True but harmful since they activate (affective or 
automatic) reactions hindering or counterproduc-
tive for me; for example, they trigger panic and this 
creates obstacles for a more successful behavior. Or I 
know of a plane crash and I decide do not take my fly. 
Or harmful since to posses that Inf expose me to be 
tortured to extort it or to be killed.
  • True but noxious since they are cognitively deviating, 
by activating biases and not so rational decisions; for 
example, ‘monetary illusion’ bias and a seeming wage 
increasing.42 Or like in the celebrated experiment of 
Wertheimer where a geometry problem was better 
solved by people ignorant in geometry, since people 
studying geometry read it in a prejudicial framework.
As for (B), let’s add that:
•  To arrive to know the truth, to have a more realistic 
and truthful view of things isn’t always an advantage for 
cognitive agents. It can reduce the possibility of success 
of our goals. That also because our ‘expectations’— 
that we formulate on the basis of our beliefs—can have 
effect on the results and be ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’. 
It is a well-known result of psychological research that 
‘optimists’ (sometime a bit gullible) systematically dis-
tort (in their favor) the perceived probability of the 
event and their control over; while ‘pessimists’ have a 
more realistic and rational view of that. Nevertheless, 
this attitude of optimists favors them and supports the 
success of their expectations. How is it possible that a 
partially deviating cognitive representation of the word 
be an advantage? The reason is that we play two very 
different kinds of “lotteries” in our life. Those were the 
probability of a given result is a priori determined and 
not influenced by the player; like to gamble with dice. 
It is useless that I “feel sure that…”, that if I play with 
my left hand the result will be the desired one, and 
so on. The probability is given (in this kind of games 
pessimists should go better). However, there are other 
‘lotteries’ in life (like courtship, like a negotiation, or a 
job interview, an exam,..) where my expectation, hope 
and trust can make the difference. If I’m quite pessi-
42 One might say that this is due to the incompleteness of that Inf or not 
fully understanding. However, on the one side, K is always incomplete; on 
the other side, here we are evaluating the value of a given K item. A K can 
be useful joined with other Ks but can be deviating if alone or with other 
wrong Ks. It can be “true” but bring to wrong or noxious conclusions.
mistic I will invest less, I will persist less and be easily 
discouraged, and I also will present a worst ‘image’ of 
me and my self-confidence. However, the result of this 
‘lottery’ is changed by how much I invest, and persist, 
and from my self-confidence message to the others. In 
other terms, my attitude affects the probability of my 
success.
Thus, a partially unrealistic and incorrect Inf and beliefs 
can help.
More in general, also at the social-political level there is 
a utility of illusory43 and utopian beliefs. They play a par-
abolic role for human ambitions and objectives: in order 
to rich X we have to aim to in Y.
“By striving to do the impossible, man has always 
achieved what is possible. Those who have cautiously 
done no more than they believed possible have never 
taken a single step forward.” Michail Bakunin
The utility of K or of believing K?
That a given Inf, a given D/K has a Value, and more pre-
cisely an Utility (in relation to our Gs and uses), does it 
mean that we believe in it “because this is convenient” for 
us? In other words: can we reformulate the problem of 
the Utility of K (that P) as “convenience to believe’? “It is 
convenient to me to believe it, then I believe it!” No. We 
have not to confuse or identify the advantage, utility of K 
(if believed and used)44 with the advantages, utility of 
believing that P.
Deciding to believe?
First of all, the basic mechanism/process of ‘decid-
ing’ to believe or better to ‘arriving’ to believe is not a 
true ‘decision’, based on advantages and convenience; I 
like to believe that P so I decide to believe it. This is in 
case just a deceptive and unconscious process of ‘moti-
vated reasoning’, or a ‘defensive mechanism’ (Miceli and 
Castelfranchi 1998). We cannot for example believe that 
something is true just because X pays us if we believe 
so, or because X would harm us if we do not believe 
so. ‘Economic’, rational, convenience doesn’t govern the 
believing ‘decision’; we can just declare to X and simulate 
that we believe what he likes. Believing process has its 
own bases: source credibility, supports, evidences (sec-
tion “The value of knowledge and its origin”); it is an 
43 To saying nothing about Leopardi’s thesis about the need for ‘illusion’ in 
human life and sufferance.
44 Of course in order to be ‘used’ and thus useful in strict sense a D must be 
‘believed’ or at least ‘assumed’ “as if ” believed. If I do not believe it, reject it, 
it is not directly useful (has no Value for me), except the utility that precisely 
rejecting it (and not doing something, believing something else thanks also 
to it as rejection, or defending other Ks) might have.
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epistemic process not a utility driven one. And the con-
venience of a given belief cannot (consciously) alter its 
‘credibility’.
Promises, threats, rewards, are useless for inducing to 
believe. This is one of the guaranties of our ‘autonomy’ 
and defense from social manipulation.45 Thus, we do not 
believe something (D/K) because it is convenient for us to 
believe it. However, to believe it is convenient and makes 
D/K convenient, useful (or dangerous). Moreover, as we 
said, the degree of certainty, how much we believe in 
D/K, increases the subjective value we ascribe to it. We 
feel safer while betting on it, and we preserve it strongly.
Let’s assume that P is good, useful for X; then also 
knowing (believing) P is useful for X. If a given K has 
value for me and is objectively useful for me, it is con-
venient to me know it and believe it; but I do not believe 
it because I think that it is convenient to me believe it: I 
believe that it is probably true, reasonably grounded, and 
useful for my goals.
In sum, we might even reformulate the problem of K 
Utility as ‘convenience to believe/assume’, provided that it 
remain clear that:
  • Utility is the usability and efficacy of K for the subject 
goals, and its certainty/safety;
  • To believe or not to believe K does not become an 
economic ‘decision’, based on the utility to believe.
Social dimensions of knowledge value
We will not focus on the crucial social dimensions of the 
theory of K Value; like:
  • K as a competitive resource and the advantage of its 
unique possess;
  • K as a Common (Hess and Ostrom 2006); “reciprocal 
altruism of K” (Conte and Castelfranchi 1995);
  • K exchange and circulation;
  • Deception and its utility;
  • Why K is ‘power’ in social sense (Bacon’s citation); 
Dependence etc.
Let’s us just give two nice examples of the Value of K 
due to its social functions.
The value of information for our image asset
A really special value acquire Inf Items about us and our 
behavior and this is why we want the other know them; 
or—vice versa—the relevance of the ‘secretes’ about us, 
45 Notice that what in this situation matters for Y and has value (for exam-
ple what X ’buys’) is not P, the content of the belief, but believing, the status 
of accepting to believe. Often it is even irrelevant the real content P, in order 
to show appeasement. What is useful to Y (and what X expects) is not P, but 
"Believes Y P"; or more precisely that "Believes X (Believes YP)".
what we hidden and don’t want the other know. The 
function of this maneuver and the positive/negative 
value of that Inf Items is the shaping of our social ‘image’ 
and of evaluation about us, then of our esteem, trust, 
reputation,..
Our comparative evaluation (due to the good informa-
tion about us and the hidden of the bad ones) is also vital 
for us because it is the substance of human social (non 
formal) hierarchies, and of our positioning in them (pres-
tige, visibility, and relational capital, opportunities..). We 
socially live of what the other know and believe about us.
To share or not to share K? Effects on its value
A general question is:
When and why that a K/Inf be shared gives it an 
additional and special Value?
When and why the circulation and sharing of K 
reduces its value?
When K has value only if it is personal, private, or of 
restricted group?
Let’s give two examples of possible reasons for K 
sharing:
A) Common ground and membership As we said, a cru-
cial criterion of certainty, credibility is the number of con-
vergent sources. So, notice that the fact that other people 
believe P or say that P increases the probability that me 
too believe so. Also for two other crucial social reasons:
•  In order to interact and communicate whit other peo-
ple (as we need) and to reduce uncertainty in coordina-
tion, cognitive activity, … we need a ‘common ground’; 
that is, to share a lot of K, and to give for granted that 
we know as they know (and vice versa), and rely on that.
So this is a value and crucial functional utility of shar-
ing K.
•  Moreover, sharing K, believing as and what the other 
believes is a condition for being and feeling “part of 
them”, a member of a given group, community, culture. 
Since we need to be part of, to belong, this is an addi-
tional function of sharing, constructing together, K.
B) Intimacy: K to be shared and not to be shared A very 
strange/remarkable form of shared/not shared K, with its 
‘rules’ in order to be and work ‘as’ “intimacy”, are those Ks 
about our body, our thinking and feelings, our story and 
narrative, that not everybody has to have access to (to 
see, to listen to,..). Otherwise I would not have ‘intimacy 
relations’ and ‘intimacy’ parts of me.
So, the rule is that there are people that has not to 
know (see,..) those Inf about “me”; I have to ‘protect’ and 
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hidden them (decency,..); while there are other people 
(my intimate relations) that has to known; I have to share 
these K with them, otherwise they are not really in ‘inti-
macy’ relation with me.
And this adds, gives special (social) Value to those Ks.
Concluding remarks
A theory of the Value/Utility of information and 
knowledge (K) is not really there. This would require 
a theory of the centrality of Goals in minds (for 
motivating and regulating adaptive action), and of 
the role that K relative to Goals and their dynamics, 
management.
K Value is a notion relative to Goal Value. Inf/K is 
precisely a resource, a means and the value of means 
depends on the value of their possible functions and uses. 
We search for, acquire, buy, preserve, use, consume,.. 
exchange… this crucial ‘power’ for achieving goals.
‘Relevance theory’, Information theory, Epistemic Util-
ity theory, etc. are not enough for providing a theory of 
the Value/Utility of K. And also truthfulness is not ‘the’ 
Value of K.
K has also costs and implies risks; it can not only be 
useful but negative and dangerous. In a sense, one should 
apply to K – in this goal-oriented perspective – an ‘eco-
nomic’ frame.
Moreover, Goals give value to K, since K serves for G 
achievement (and also planning, choice, decision..), but 
also the other way around. It is a dialectic relation: K 
gives Value to Goals since their value depends on beliefs 
about their outcome (expectations), about consequences 
(harms, costs,..), their probability, etc. And also – for the 
‘felt’ not ‘reasoned’ Goal Value—from beliefs about pos-
sible pleasant/unpleasant events, the memory traces of 
emotional experiences or sensations (somatic markers): 
this information/K items gives value to that possible Goal.
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Appendix 1
Also this issue is of course much more complex and sub-
tle. For example, it is even possible that a given represen-
tation “says” something about something Obj’ that is not 
in its content! It can (be used for) inform us that Obj’ is 
absent, is not there, isn’t the object of that representation 
or predicate. However, since the set of absent content is 
infinite, in order that representation being “about” Obj, in 
fact it is necessary another representation that explicitly 
contains Obj’. Either:
i. From Repp’ (where Obj is NOT there) we can infer 
a Repp” strictly and directly about Obj. For example, 
from R’: “Mary loves Paul” (& “Mary loves only one 
man”) we derives R” that “Mary does not love John”. 
Thus R’ in indirectly about John; but it is necessary 
that the R’ where John is not contained is combined 
with another R where it is there. Or:
ii. An image where there is no Obj’ (a given cat), 
informs us that “the cat was/is not there”, but only 
if we put this R’ in relation, compared with, another 
representation R” containing (directly about) that cat 
and we—by comparing—see that that Obj’ (and not 
un infinite number of other Objs) is NOT there.
Appendix 2
Another bad mess, typical of psychological approaches 
to ‘motivation’ (that should actually be called “the theory 
of goals and their origins and dynamics”) is the (implicit 
or explicit) identification of “motivation” and “emotion”. 
It is true that emotions are one of the sources and trig-
gers of goals: this is part of their “conative” nature; these 
are “impulses”, and part of “drives”. And it is also true that 
emotions are “signals” of the status of our relevant goals; 
they monitor some important and specific goals of ours 
(fear is about safety; shame is about social image; pride 
is about our value, mastery and sense of competence; 
etc.). In other words: a theory of emotions intrinsically 
requires a theory of goals: no emotions without goals. 
But not the other way around. The theory of goals is not 
grounded on emotions and does not intrinsically require 
them. We can have a perfect ‘goal-directed’, intentional, 
agent without any emotion. What is intrinsically needed 
is a ‘value’ of its goals/motives; either due to selection or 
to learning or reasoning.
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